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I. SANCTIONABLE CONDUCT 
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A. RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL RENDERED A DUBIOUS OATH UNDER PENALTY 
OF PERJURY CONCERNING THE EXTENSION OF TIME NECESSARY TO FILE 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
In his AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, dated June 14, 2012, respondent's 
counsel stated the following: " ... the drafting of the Respondent's Brief and my client's internal 
review process cannot be completed within the time remaining. The thirty six (36) day 
extension is sought in order to accommodate schedules and ensure filing of the Brief within the 
extended period." (Emboldening and underlining added.) 
In actuality, respondent's briefwas filed on June 26, 2012. This was only seven (7) days after the 
original due date for the filing of the brief, which was June 19, 2012. Therefore, contrary to what 
was stated under oath in the above affidavit, an extension of only one week not five weeks and 
one day was necessary to draft and file respondent's brief. 
Appellant was shocked and amazed to receive the MOTION and AFFIDAVIT referred to above. 
There are two reasons for appellant's reaction. The first is that appellant believed respondent's 
counsel's affidavit in which counsel stated that he required the thirty-six (36) day extension "to 
accommodate schedules and ensure filing of the brief within the extended period," 
(Emboldening and underlining added) 
The second is that respondent's counsel confirmed, under penalty of perjury, that all the 
statements in the AFFIDAVIT were essentially true and accurate to the best of his knowledge. 
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When appellant received respondent's brief on June 27, 2012, it seemed evident that the service 
of the brief was in direct contradiction to Mr. Thomson's statements in the AFFIDAVIT filed in 
the Idaho Supreme Court. 
B. RESPONDENT CLEARLY VIOLATED I.A.R.l1.2. 
Of much more importance, respondent directly violated I.A.R. 11.2 in a significant portion of its 
brief I.A.R. 11.2 provides in relevant part: 
" ... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney 
or party has read the ... brief ... ; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law ... and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose such as to harass, or to cause unreasonable delay or needless increase in 
the costs oflitigation. If the ... brief ... is signed in violation of this rule, the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction ... " 
Respondent's violation of the above statute involves the last four sentences on page 25 of 
respondent's brief. These four sentences, authored by respondent's counsel, are as follows: 
"To clarify the record, the so-called denial letter dated June 10, 2010, is not a denial letter. 
(R., p. 451-454) It is a reservation of rights letter that was issued during the pendency of 
the investigation. Id at p. 451. In fact, the letter specifically states "[t]his is not to be 
construed as a denial of your claim. The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge there are 
coverage questions with regard to your loss." (R., p. 453)" 
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These sentences were outright fabrications. There is no other plausible explanation why these 
sentences were included in the brief other than to deceive appellant and the Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
On June 10, 2010 respondent's claims representative, Dmma Hoyne, sent appellant a five page 
letter. (R., p. 811-815) On page 5 of the June 10, 2010 letter, Ms. Hoyne unequivocally stated 
that there will be no insurance coverage for appellant's losses. The relevant part of page 5 is as 
follows: 
"As you can see from the policy language quoted above, there is no coverage for 
the water damage to your home, as all known evidence indicates water entered 
your structure through the basement foundation wall at a point underground. 
Therefore we are unable to assist you with the cost of drying out or repairing 
your home." (Emboldening and underlining added.) 
It is difficult to imagine a much more definite insurer coverage denial letter than the one quoted 
directly above. The last four sentences on page 25 of respondent's brief are directly opposite 
from what was said by Ms. Hoyne in her June 10, 2010 letter. (R., p. 811-815) 
The June 10, 201 0 letter from Ms. Hoyne could not be more clear that it was a coverage denial 
letter. Nowhere in the June 10, 2010 letter does it state that it was only a reservation of rights 
letter. Nowhere in the June 10, 2010 letter does it state that it was not to be construed as a denial 
of appellant's claim. Nowhere in the June 10, 2010 letter does it state that the purpose of the 
letter was to only acknowledge that there were coverage questions with regard to appellant's 
loss. (R., p. 811-815) 
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On the bottom of page 25 of respondent's brief, the last four sentences, including the quote, 
appear to be entirely made up by respondent's counsel. None of the statements, or sentences 
quoted,are even arguably contained in the June 10, 2010 letter. It could not be clearer that Ms. 
Hoyne's June 10,2010 letter completely conflicts with the language on page 25 of respondent's 
brief. (R., p. 811-815) 
In summary, "If the ... brief ... is signed in violation of this rule, the court upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an 
appropriate sanction ... " I.A.R. 11.2. Respondent's fabrication concerning the language used in 
its claims representative's June 10, 2010 letter is unquestionably in violation of I.A.R. 11.2 and 
constitutes grounds for sanctioning 
Irrespective of what occurs during this sanction assessment process, appellant is concerned that 
respondent has fabricated other facts or conclusions to support its arguments in this appeal. 
Appellant is especially anxious that he may miss other fabrications and the Court may base, at 
least in part, its appellate evaluation on these fabrications. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S! APPELLANT'S MOTION 
OF OBJECTION TO THE CLERK'S ENTIRE RECORD FOR THE IDAHO SUPREME 
COURT APPEAL WAS IMPROPER 
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Consistently with all other significant matters in this lawsuit, on this motion Judge Hansen again 
ruled against Pro Se plaintiff and in favor of defendant State Farm Insurance Company. Such 
ruling on this motion is contained in the court's May 15,2012 ORDER and his May 18,2012 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. (Exhibits 1 and 2.) As with each of the other important motions, 
District Court Judge Hansen did not correctly apply governing statutory and case law. 
Moreover, in ruling on this motion, Judge Hansen did not even comport with the Idaho ProSe 
Appellant's Handbook. Pro Se appellant in this litigation has relied extensively on that appellant 
handbook throughout this appeal. The chart of the handbook which has direct application to this 
issue is entitled "Deadlines: Appeals from the District Courts". Below the above title on the left 
side of the page is the heading "Document". Below the above title on the right side of the page is 
the heading "Deadline (I.A.R.)". 
In one rectangular box below the title, on the left side of the page, is the following language: 
"Request for Additional Transcript or Record". Directly adjacent to that entry, on the right side 
ofthe page, is the answer which is: "14 days from date Notice of Appeal is filed. 19(d)" Along 
with the other applicable legal precedent on this subject, Judge Hansen simply ignored this entry. 
The primary argument made by Judge Hansen in his MEMORANDUM DECISION is that I.A.R. 
19(c) applies only to the initial request for additional documents in the appellate record. 
Parties in appeals are never required to perform this mandatory responsibility when any party 
in the litigation objects to the District Court Clerk's record. (Paragraph 2 on page 3 of the 
MEMORANDUM.) 
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He goes on to indicate that in the present case since I.A.R. 29(a) provides for settlement of the 
record, which is after the clerk serves the parties with the record, respondent may file its 
/{request for this additional materials" within 14 days after the plaintiffs/appellant's motion 
objecting to the record was decided and the record was settled. (Paragraph 2 on page 3 of the 
MEMORANDUM.} 
However, nowhere in I.A.R. 29(a) does it say that a party has 14 days from the date the record 
has been settled to file its "request for these additional materials". Moreover, I.A.R. 29(a} 
relates to filing objections to the record. Different examples are given in the statute concerning 
what objections can be made. Additions to the record is only one example of a type of an 
objection which can be asserted. Defendant/Respondent never did object to the record to 
request document additions in this case because it never complied with I.A.R. 19(c}. 
Both the defendant/respondent and the District Court Judge overlook the fact that I.A.R. 19(c) 
And I.A.R. 28(a) makes it abundantly clear that a respondent MUST file a "request for this 
additional material" within 14 days of the filing of notice of appeal" ... This obligation is 
mandatory based on the language of the statute. Filing the "request for this additional 
material", on April16, 2012, 48 days late, is not an acceptable legal failure. I.A.R.19(c) 
To circumvent this legal obligation, Judge Hansen merely says that respondent's request is 
valid but not necessary because the district court clerk designated the entire record anyway. 
On this issue, Judge Hansen failed to consider that the District Court Clerk was never requested 
by any party in this litigation within the permissible time period to provide the entire case 
record to the Supreme Court. 
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Consistent with this premise is that the District Court Clerk did not comply with I.A.R. 28(c). 
That rule provides: 
"The clerk's ... record shall also include all additional documents requested by 
any party in the notice of appeal, notice of cross-appeal, and requests for 
additional documents in the record." (Emboldening and underlining added.) 
Respondent never requested any additional documents so the District Court Clerk did not act in 
compliance with the above statute. 
Since the District Court Clerk's designation of the entire case file was not valid, neither was the 
defendant/respondent's 48 day belated designated record of the entire case. The 
incorrect legal action by the District Court Clerk does not legitimize the incorrect legal action of 
the defendant/respondent. 
Furthermore, neither I.A.R.19(c) nor I.AR 28(a) contain any language which can be construed as 
meaning the settlement of the record becomes the operative date when the 14 day time period 
begins to run. In fact, I.A.R.19(c) contains exactly the opposite language. I.A.R.19(c) states: 
"respondent MUST file a request for this additional material within 14 days of the filing of the 
notice of appeal..." (Capitalization, emboldening and underlining added.) 
Respondent's failure to comply with the above statutes has far reaching implications. In the 
respondent's brief, State Farm can only refer to the standard record pleadings and documents 
and the documents designated by appellant in his Notice of Appeal as set forth in I.A.R. 17(i}. 
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The only relevant standard record documents in this appeal are: 
C. The original and any amended complaint .... 
D. The original and any amended answer .... 
K. Notice of Appeal .... {Exhibit 3) 
The only documents designated by appellant in his Notice of Appeal are: 
"a. Pro Per plaintiffs Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment, including 
all attached affidavits and exhibits; 
b. District Judge Timothy Hansen's January 9, 2012 MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER granting defendant's Motion for summary judgment; 
c. Pro Per plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, including attached affidavits 
and exhibits; 
d. Pro Per Plaintiffs Reply Brief on Motion to Amend Complaint, including 
attached affidavits and exhibits; 
e. Pro Per Plaintiffs Supplemental Brief on Motion to Amend Complaint, 
including attached affidavits and exhibits; 
f. District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order denying Pro 
Per plaintiffs Motion To Amend The Complaint; 
g. Pro Per plaintiffs Opposition To Motion For Protective Order, including 
attached affidavits and exhibits; 
h. District Judge Timothy Hansen's March 15, 2011 interlocutory order granting 
defendant's Motion For Protective Order." 
The District Court Clerk's Record numbers for the documents designated directly above are: R., 
p. 192-228, 229-260, 275-334, 460-473, 483-484, 527-535, 545-557, 763-833, 847-858. 
Assuming that the Supreme Court holds that respondent cannot cite documents anywhere in 
the entire District Court Clerk's file in violation ofl.A.R. 19(c) and I.A.R. 28(a), then again 
State Farm can only refer to the standard record pleadings and documents and the documents 
designated by appellant in his Notice of Appeal as set forth in I.A.R. 17(i). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant disagrees with some ofthe legal conclusions, and more significantly omissions in 
respondent's NATURE OF THE CASE section in its brief. To avoid repetition of appellant's 
disagreements, appellant believes that the same entitled section, which is in his initial appellant's 
brief is both more accurate and describes the important aspects of this litigation much more 
thoroughly. 
Appellant apologizes if respondent or the Court construes appellant's repeated referral to the third 
incident of water damage as a third claim that appellant is advancing. Appellant is not doing that at 
this point in the case. In fact, referral to the ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL on page 22 of 
appellant's brief should make it apparent that none of the issues presented on appeal have anything 
to do with adding a third claim to this lawsuit. 
Appellant referred to this third incident to substantiate the causes of action in the complaint 
before it was dismissed by the District Court. Additionally, discussion of the third incident was 
done to justify appellant's emotional distress and punitive damage claims. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant agrees with the first through ninth proceedings listed in respondent's brief. 
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Appellant disagrees with the tenth and eleventh entries listed in respondent's brief. Appellant 
believes the DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS section of appellant's brief is much more 
accurate and conveys more information than the similar section in respondent's brief. 
The history of the district court's actions in this litigation confirms Judge Hansen's inexplicable 
bias against the prose appellant. Now more than ever, after the judge's ruling to deny appellant's 
motion to exclude most of the District Court Clerk's entire record, appellant believes that he will 
lose and respondent State Farm will win all future motions brought in this lawsuit brought before 
District Judge Timothy Hansen. 
The most unsettling development in this case occurred in connection with Judge Hansen's ruling 
on the summary judgment motion. In the ruling, Judge Hansen awarded State Farm Insurance 
Company, the largest insurance company in the United States, attorney's fees for the entire case 
to be paid by the pro se plaintiff/appellant. Judge Hansen never gave any plausible explanation 
for his ruling which could have caused appellant to declare bankruptcy or lose his home, or both. 
On pages two and three of respondent's brief, State Farm Insurance Company, and its counsel, 
omit full discussion of some very important events. The initial hearing on the Summary 
Judgment Motion was held on November 17, 2011 at 4:00p.m. During the hearing, Judge 
Hansen orally granted the motion for Summary Judgment and awarded State Farm all the 
attorneys fees it had incurred in the entire litigation. 
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Then on February 14,2010 at 3:30p.m., appellant attended a hearing on a motion which was 
entitled Motion Re The Proposed Judgment. (Exhibit 4) The hearing was held because State 
Farm was seeking its attorney's fees for the entire lawsuit. At the hearing, Judge Hansen granted 
State Farm's motion and for a second time awarded attorney's fees in favor of respondent 
and against the pro se plaintiff/appellant. At the hearing, the Judge advised State Farm to file 
a memorandum within fourteen days setting forth the exact amount of attorney's fees and costs it 
had incurred in the entire lawsuit. (See exhibits 4 and 5- appellant's notes of the hearing.) 
State Farm never filed the above requested memorandum so the ruling awarding it attorney's 
fees was dropped. That is why the final judgment in the case does not refer to any attorney's fees 
award to State Farm to be paid by the pro se plaintiff/appellant. (Exhibit 6.) 
It is appellant's opinion that in this case the District Judge has been consistently violating the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, including Canons 1; 3A., 3B(2), 3B(3), 3B(6), 3B(8), and 3C(l). 
Under I.A.R, Rule 48 and any other applicable statutes or case law, appellant requests that the 
Honorable Timothy Hansen, District Judge be sanctioned for his improprieties. 
C. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant strongly disagrees with many of the statements contained in respondent's statements in 
this section of its brief. 
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Respondent's first statement is an opinionated, accusation without any reference to the legally 
acceptable part of the District Court Clerk's record or to any evidence in this case at all. 
Respondent's second statement is an incomplete accusation. Page 322 ofthe District Court 
Clerk's record is the beginning of plaintiff/appellant's aft! davit in the motion to amend the 
complaint. Page six ofthat document (R., P. 327.) refers to the June 5, 2010 and June 8, 2010 
letters. This page of the affidavit listed the letters as Exhibit H and Exhibit I. 
Appellant designated pages 275-334, which is the motion to amend the complaint with his 
attached affidavits and exhibits, The District Court Clerk's record, page 327, is obviously within 
that group of pages. Therefore, the page which lists those letters as exhibits is also contained in 
the District Court Clerks record. 
Since the appellant's designation of documents called for those letters to be included within the 
limited record, appellant took all reasonable measures to ensure that the District Court Clerk 
performed his duties correctly. This is especially true when appellant learned that the clerk 
transferred the entire case file to the Supreme Com1. Because this was done, appellant logically 
expected his designated documents to have been included. 
Respondent's third statement focuses on a relatively unimportant issue. Moreover, at the outset 
of appellant's discussion on this issue, it should be pointed out that the pro se appellant is not a 
partner in a law firm as is respondent's counsel. Prose appellant cannot rely on the assistance of 
secretaries, paralegals, associates, and other partners for assistance in the lawsuit. Pro se 
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appellant does not have the almost unlimited legal office supplies, legal devices, or the legal 
technological resources that respondent's counsel does being in a large law firm and representing 
the largest insurance company in the United States. Therefore, prose plaintiff was required to 
use the documents in his possession as exhibits. 
Appellant will now discuss each of the specific criticisms of exhibits in appellant's brief that 
respondent raises. 
Appellant's exhibit 5 is not a very good copy. It has only three small parentheses and a paperclip 
on page 7 of the insurance policy marked as Exhibit 5. This minimal error is on one of twenty-
five pages ofthe insurance policy. Again, prose appellant does not have the legal devices and 
equipment that respondent's counsel does to prevent such minimal occurrences from happening. 
Exhibit 7 contains numerous handwritten entries on pages of the exhibit. At the time the 
appellant's brief was prepared only the documents which were at appellant's home could have 
been used as exhibits. Appellant admits the error in attaching such an exhibit with handwriting 
on it in the appellant brief Appellant requests that such handwriting be ignored by respondent 
and this Court. 
Appellant sees nothing wrong with Exhibit 8. 
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Exhibit 9 also has handwriting on several of its fifteen pages. This handwriting consists mainly 
of circled paragraphs and a few sets of parentheses. Once again, appellant requests that such 
handwriting be ignored by respondent and this Court. 
Respondent's fourth statement is incorrect. As was previously stated, appellant is not making a 
third claim in this lawsuit at the present time. Appellant did discuss the January rainfall and 
flooding incident several times but that was for the reasons listed earlier in . Idaho Code of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 15( a) this reply brief. 
Respondent's fifth statement is correct from a factual standpoint. However, it is not correct from 
a legal standpoint. Under the Title of I.A.R. 17( e) "Designation of Appeal", Section I.A.R. 17(f) 
provides: 
"A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to assert in the 
appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal (which refers to those set forth in the Notice 
of Appeal.) shall not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal." 
The other documents, conversations, and actions are part of issues which will be further evidence 
of the propriety of appellant's causes of action in the complaint and the emotional distress and 
punitive damages claims. 
Similar to respondent's first statement, its sixth statement (which is only listed in the form of a 
footnote.) is an opinionated assertion which appellant believes is in many ways factually 
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incorrect and unsupported by law. 
On a different subject, which appears later in this section, on page 5 of respondent's Concise 
Statement of Facts, it is maintained: "Based upon the information compiled through the 
investigation and an analysis of the Policy, State Farm denied the May claim on June 10, 201 0." 
On page 25 of its brief, respondent made completely opposite assertions. Respondent's reference 
to the same June 10, 2010 letter on page 25 was quoted earlier in this reply brief but will be 
quoted again to make it absolutely clear that the opposite contentions were being advanced: 
"To clarify the record, the so-called denial letter dated June 10, 2010, is not a denial letter. 
(R., p. 451-454.) It is a reservation of rights letter that was issued during the pendency of 
the investigation. Id at p. 451. In fact, the letter specifically states "t]his is not to be 
construed as a denial of your claim. The purpose of this letter is to acknowledge there are 
coverage questions with regard to your loss." (R., p. 453.)" 
Given the two sets of inconsistent statements argued by respondent, the reader of respondent's 
brief can only wonder; 
1. Is the June 10,2010 letter a denial letter, or not? 
2. Is the June 10,2010 letter a reservation ofrights letter, or not? 
3. Should the June 10, 2010 letter tot be construed as a denial of your (appellant's) claim, or not? 
4. Is the purpose of the June 10, 2010 letter only to acknowledge there are coverage questions 
with regard to your (appellant's) loss, or not? 
Even more problematic for respondent and its attorney is that the inconsistent statements referred 
to above heighten and confirm their violation of I.A.R. 11.2. 
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Unquestionably, there is no doubt now that respondent's counsel did not read or understand the 
blatant contradiction between page 5 of the June 10, 2010 letter and page 25 of respondent's brief. 
There is no doubt now that the conflicting statements on page 5 of the June 5, 2010 letter and page 25 
of respondent's brief are not well grounded in fact or warranted by law. There is no doubt now that the 
conflicting statements on page 5 of the June 10, 2010 letter and page 25 of respondent's brief were 
interposed to harass, or to cause unreasonable delay or needless increase in appellant's costs in this 
litigation. There is no doubt now that sanctions are appropriate under I.A.R. 11.2 because of the 
respondent's and its attorney's violations of this statute. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
At the beginning of the ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL Section, it is claimed that: 
" ... (the) issues listed in Appellant's Brief are insufficient, incomplete, or present additional issues for 
review. I.A.R. 35(b) (4). Consistent with Rizzo's Notice of Appeal, Rizzo fails to list any issues on appeal." 
(See respondent's brief, page 5) 
In the same paragraph on page 5, respondent's counsel contends that he will"attempt" to 
set forth those issues on appeal Rizzo did not set forth." Once again, it is difficult to understand 
respondent's assertions. 
Initially, it is hard to believe that respondent's counsel read or understood appellant's Notice of 
Appeal. On page 3 of the Notice of Appeal it is stated: "Plaintiff intends to assert the following issues on 
appeal regarding District Judge Timothy Hansen's judgment and orders in this litigation. On the 
following page, the title of the list of issues is JUDGMENT AND ORDERS APPEALED. There are six issues 
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set forth below the title. 
Secondly, it appears that the above language is simple enough to understand as presenting the issues 
being appealed from and discussed at length in the appellant's brief. Perhaps respondent is criticizing 
appellant's presentation of the issues as being judgments or orders instead of setting forth an extremely 
lengthy list of factual contentions. What respondent is overlooking is I.A.R. 17(e), which is entitled 
Designation of Appeal. Subsection (1) of I.A.R. 17(e) is entitled as follows: 11Designation of the 
Judgment or Order Appealed From. The notice of appeal shall designate the judgment or order 
appealed from .... " (See also I.A.R. 35(a) (4) 
Therefore, respondent's argument concerning the inadequacy of respondent's listing of issues is both 
factually incorrect and in contradiction of the applicable law. Respondent's listing of issues on appeal is 
improperly advanced, not necessary, and misstates the issues appellant has correctly presented in his 
Notice of Appeal in accordance with the Idaho Appellant Rules. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
1. Waiver of Appeal by Respondent Concerning Propriety of Summary Judgment Motion 
in Contention 
Decisive on almost every issue in this appeal of respondent's summary judgment motion is the 
subject of whether there was a waiver by respondent. Waiver is in direct rebuttal of 
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respondent's theme that there was no coverage. This no coverage theme was set forth again 
and again and again in respondent's brief. 
The language contained on page 4 of appellant's motion to the Supreme Court not to permit 
the entire Clerk's record for this appeal, which sets forth the gist of appellant's argument on 
waiver, is as follows: 
11DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO REQUEST FOR THIS 
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL 
On the Clerk's Certificate of Appeal, across from the: "Attorney for Respondent" entry, 
the name James D. LaRue was crossed out in pen ink. Then in pen ink the name Jeffrey 
A. Thomson was written on that line. This establishes that defendant's/respondent's 
counsel possessed and read the document. Further down the page there is an entry 
entitled "Respondent's Request for additional clerk's record filed "Across from that 
entry the line is left blank. (Exhibit 7) 
Defendants/respondent's counsel did not write or type in any statement on the above entry. Then 
on AprilS, 2012, which was 36 days after State Farm Insurance Company's "request for additional 
material" was mandatorily due; defendant's/respondent's attorneys authored and sent a letter to 
the Clerk of the District Court and the Supreme Court. In the letter it was stated: 
"With this correction {removing James D. LaRue's name and replacing it with 
Jeffrey A. Thomson's name"), the Clerk's Certification of Appeal appears to be in 
order." {Exhibit 8) 
In clear error, the District Court Judge ruled that neither the absence in the Clerk's Certificate of 
Appeal nor defendant/respondent's April 5, 2012 letter constituted a waiver by State Farm 
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Insurance Company. 
For both of these reasons the District Court Judge's ruling should be overturned on appeal. 
2. Standard of review for Summary Judgment Motion 
Appellant disagrees with respondent's biased title for this subsection which is contained in 
respondent's brief so appellant changed the title. Appellant does agree with the very limited 
case law authority cited in respondent's brief. However, the case law cited is woefully 
incomplete. To provide a complete and correct standard of review for a summary judgment 
motion appellant is going to repeat the standard set forth in his Opposition to the Summary 
Judgment Motion: 
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56( c) sets forth the standard for granting or 
denying summary judgment motions. It provides: " ... The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law ... ". 
"The court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the 
nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of 
the nonmoving party". State of Idaho, et al. v. Rubbermaid Incorporated, an Ohio 
corporation 129 Idaho 353, 355-356 (1996). See also Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers 
Insurance Company of Idaho 145 Idaho 459, 461 (2008); Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Idaho v. Talbot 133 Idaho 428, 431 (1999); Bonz v. Sudweeks 119 Idaho 538, 
541 (1991). 
"If there are conflicting inferences contained in the record or reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, summary judgment MUST BE DENIED." 
State ofldaho, et al. v. Rubbermaid Incorporated, an Ohio corporation 129 Idaho 
353, 356 (1996), see also Bonz v. Sudweeks 119 Idaho at 538, 541 (1991). 
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"When interpreting insurance policies, this court applies the general rule of 
contract law subject to certain canons of construction. The general rule is that, 
because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, typically not subject to 
negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the contract must be 
construed most strongly against the insurer." Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers 
Insurance Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459,461 (2008). 
"The BURDEN is in on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes 
to restrict the scope of its coverage." Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance 
Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459, 461 (2008). (Emphasis added) It is always 
defendant's burden of proof to establish that a specific policy exclusion does 
apply. Id at 461. "A provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage must be 
strictly construed in favor of the insured." Id at 461. 
"Under these special rules, insurance policies are to be construed most liberally in 
favor of recovery by the insured. The meaning of the insurance policy and the 
intent of the parties must be determined from the PLAIN meaning of the 
insurance policy's own words. Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co.145 Idaho 
313,318 (2008), See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. ofPittsburg v. Dixon 141 
Idaho 537, 540 (2005) 
"This Court (the Idaho Supreme Court) has recognized a 'special relationship 
between insurer and insured which requires that the parties deal with each other 
fairly, honestly, and in good faith' and acknowledge the disparity in bargaining 
power between an insurer and insured. Featherstone et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 
Idaho 840, 843, 875 (1994) ... Policyholders purchase insurance to help protect 
themselves from some of the financial consequences created by mishaps such as 
occurred here. They place trust and confidence in the insurer." Weinstein, et al, v. 
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, et al. 149 Idaho 299, 339 
(2010). (R., p.764-765) 
3. Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation Issues 
Discussion of the standard of review for insurance contracts, not all contracts, is extensively 
discussed above and will not be repeated here. 
4. Standard of Review for Motion to Amend Complaints 
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Appellant again objects to the biased title in this subsection and changed it. Appellant also 
seriously objects to the characterization of the law made by respondent, especially the second 
sentence of the subsection, which plainly distorts and misstates the law. To adequately and 
honestly state the law on this subject, appellant is going to refer to his Motion to Amend the 
Complaint. Idaho Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a) sets forth the applicable law relating to 
the amendment of complaints after a responsive pleading is served or the action is set for trial. It 
is stated in Rule 15(a) that" ... a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court ... , and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires, ... " (R., p.285.) 
5. Standard of Review for Punitive Damages 
Again, respondent's statement concerning this standard is misleading and completely inadequate. 
Appellant's correct interpretation of this standard is as follows. 
According to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell et al. 538 U.S. 
408 (2003)1 the United States Supreme Court held that a punitive damage award in a state was 
authorized by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (R., p.285.) 
Idaho Code Section 6-1604(2) provides in relevant part: 
"In all civil actions (in Idaho) in which punitive damages are permitted, no claim 
for damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive 
damages. However, a party may, pursuant to a pretrial motion and 
after hearing before the court, amend the pleadings to include a prayer 
for relief seeking punitive damages. The court shall allow the motion to 
amend the pleadings if, after weighing the evidence presented, the 
court concludes that, the moving party has established at such hearing 
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a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an 
award of punitive damages." 
Idaho Code Section 6-1601 (9) provides: 
"Punitive damages" means damages awarded to a claimant, over and above what 
will compensate the claimant for actual personal injury and property damage, "to 
serve the public policies of punishing a defendant for outrageous conduct and of 
deterring future like conduct.". (R., p.285.) 
6. Standard of Review for Motion For Protective Order 
Appellant once again objects to the biased title in this subsection and changes it. Appellant also 
seriously objects to the deceptive and incomplete characterization of the applicable law advanced 
by respondent. 
To provide a complete and accurate standard of review for a motion for protective order, 
appellant will repeat the standard set forth in his opposition to respondent's subject motion. 
Idaho Rule of Ci vii Procedure, 26(b) ( 1) provides in part: 
"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to 
a claim or defense ... " 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. The District Court Did Not Realistically Consider, Let Alone Follow, Applicable 
Summary Judgment Principles 
The above entitled subsection, subsection 1, begins on page 8 in respondent's brief and ends on 
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page 14. The argument contained in the brief is significantly based on portions of the District 
Court Clerk's record which were not properly requested or designated by respondent pursuant to 
I.A.R. 19(c) or 28(a). 
The improper portions of the District Court Clerk's record replied upon by respondent, in the 
order listed in respondent's brief include pages 843, 693-694, 695-696, 369, 373-377, 383, 427 
723, and 758. 
There are so many improper record references in this subsection that it is extremely difficult to 
determine which parts of the arguments made are inappropriately based on such references. 
Therefore, Subsection 1 should be ignored in its entirety. 
If this Court decides not to do so, then appellant will state the following facts. Respondent does 
correctly share some of the applicable statutory law on the summary judgment standard. I.R.C.P. 
56( c). However, respondent completely omits discussion of any of the governing case law. 
That case law includes: State of Idaho, et al. v. Rubbermaid Incorporated, an Ohio corporation 
129 Idaho 353 (1996), Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459 
(2008), Farmers Ins. Co. ofldaho v. Talbot 133 Idaho 428 (1999), Bonz v. Sudweeks 119 Idaho 
538 (1991), Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co.145 Idaho 313 (2008), National Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Dixon 141 Idaho 537 (2005), Featherstone et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 
Idaho 840(1994), and Weinstein, et al, v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 
et al. 149 Idaho 299 (2010). 
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In the event this Court disagrees in any way with the above premises advanced by appellant, he 
will now analyze respondent's arguments briefly. Appellant would like to clarify to this Court 
though that he has already arguably rebutted respondent's arguments in detail in the appellant's 
brief, pages 23-27. 
It is noteworthy to initially emphasize that the applicable statute, I.R.C.P. 56( c), makes it 
abundantly clear that summary judgment should only be granted when the nonmoving party 
in the case cannot show a genuine issue of any material fact. In the present case, only appellant 
has experts. Plaintiff's first expert is on causation issues. The second expert is on coverage and 
damages issues. (R., p. 768, 772-776.) 
Respondent has no experts. Appellant is certainly not an expert as respondent contends. 
Respondent claims representatives, agents and team managers are not experts either. (R., p. 768, 
772-773, 783.) 
In this appeal, appellant has gone well beyond demonstrating that there are numerous genuine 
issues of material facts in this case. Appellant has submitted the only admissible evidence on the 
causation and coverage issues in this case. Respondent has no admissible evidence at all on these 
crucial issues. Consequently, the summary judgment motion unquestionably should have been 
denied. 
2. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Breach of Contact 
Cause of Action 
Respondent's argument in the above entitled subsection begins on page 14 in respondent's brief 
29 
and ends on page 27. The argument contained in the brief is substantially based on repeating 
portions of the District Court Clerk's record which were not properly requested or designated by 
respondent pursuant to I.A.R. 19(c) or 28(a). 
In the order listed in respondent's brief the improper portions of the District Court Clerk's record 
replied upon by respondent in this section include pages 408, 408-410, 411, 152, 724, 735, 736, 
453, 103, 12, 16, and 386-426. Many of these citations are repeated again and again in this 
subsection. 
Almost equally as problematic for respondent is its continued reference to cases in entirely 
different jurisdictions and involving considerably different factual situations. These cases cited 
also involve completely different insurers and disparate policy language. These improper cases 
are cited one or more times on pages 17, 18, 21, 22, and 24. 
What happened from a litigation perspective during Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast, the 
worst natural disaster in U.S. history? The injuries and losses were incredibly widespread and 
tragic, but that litigation was entirely different from this case. (Home Insurers' Secret Tactics 
Cheat Fire Victims, Hike Profit R., p. 244-259) 
What happened in the Insurance Company ofNorth America litigation in Washington, which 
again involved a different jurisdiction, different insurer, different policy language and different 
factual situation? That lawsuit was so dissimilar to this case that it cannot even be mildly 
persuasive. This is true in all the out of jurisdiction cases cited by respondent. 
There are so many improper record references in this subsection that it is extremely difficult to 
determine which parts of the arguments made are inappropriately based on such references. 
In the event this Court disagrees with the above premises in any way, appellant will now analyze 
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respondent's arguments briefly. Appellant would like to clarify to this Court the topics raised in 
respondent's brief are not new topics. They have already been rebutted in detail in appellant's 
brief, pages 27-39. 
Initially, appellant would like to address the subject of whether the Homeowners' Insurance 
policy is ambiguous or not. At the outset appellant stresses "The burden is on the insurer to use 
clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage." Miguel Arreguin v. 
Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 145 Idaho 459,461 (2008). "A provision that seeks to 
exclude the insurer's coverage must be strictly construed in favor of the insured." Id at 461. 
Throughout respondent's brief, its counsel repeatedly and fervently disagrees with appellant 
about the meaning of each policy provision of even questionable relevance. Respondent's 
counsel argues every time that he is right and appellant is wrong in his understanding and 
interpretations of the policy. Appellant believes respondent's counsel is incorrect in his 
interpretation of the policy. Such completely different viewpoints, by themselves alone, make it 
indisputably clear that the policy is ambiguous. 
It is also important that on page 7 of the Homeowners Policy in Section 1, - LOSSES 
INSURED, it is stated that coverage is provided for Explosion, Riot or civil commotion, or 
Aircraft (including self propelled missiles and spacecraft) etc. Nowhere in the LOSSES 
INSURED SECTION does it say that if such damage occurs to the physical structure of the 
dwelling, there would be no coverage. This is despite the fact that logically the above incidents 
would cause tremendous damage to the dwelling. 
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Moreover, even more important is that there is not a single reference to rain in the LOSSES 
UNINSURED portion of the Homeowners Policy. Given these and other facts discussed above, 
ifthe policy is not ambiguous, then it is explicitly in appellant's favor. 
Respondent devotes so many pages to the concurrent cause argument and the references to rain 
in its appellate brief, that these contentions will be specifically and briefly discussed here, even 
though they are analyzed to a great extent in appellant's brief. 
The concurrent cause argument fails in this case for two reasons. The first is that the concurrent 
cause provision cited by State Farm's counsel, on page 16 of respondent's brief, is certainly 
unintelligible to the average insured. Even the vast majority of engineers who design homes and 
general contractors who build homes would wonder what that utterly confusing language means. 
Secondly, the actual causes of the extensive damages suffered by appellant are rain and wind 
blowing in the right direction. Neither of these occurrences are excluded events. This is evident 
from a review of the policy. Wind is not discussed as an excluded event. Rain is discussed as a 
SECTION I- LOSSES INSURED, but not in the LOSSES UNINSURED section at all. 
Perhaps in making his numerous accusations about appellant's interpretation of Homeowners 
Policy provisions, respondent's counsel overlooks the governing case law on this subject in 
Idaho. Again, "The burden is in on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to 
restrict the scope of its coverage." Miguel Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 145 
Idaho 459,461 (2008). "A provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage must be strictly 
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construed in favor of the insured." Id at 461. The absence of the words "wind" and "rain" in the 
LOSSES UNINSURED SECTION defeats all respondent's arguments in this section. 
Respondent also waived its right to make any arguments in support of the contractual segment of 
the summary judgment to motion. 
Additionally, appellant believes that subsections a., b., c., and d. in subsection 2 of respondent's 
brief have already been refuted at length in this reply brief on pages 3-8,8-13, 19-20,20-21, and 
in appellant's brief, pages 27-39.Therefore, appellant does not wish to belabor the points he has 
already made. 
3. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Bad Faith Cause of 
Action 
In appellant's brief, this subject was discussed in detail on pages 39-40 of the brief. In addition, it 
is useful to emphasize that the misconduct of insurers, of which State Farm is the largest in the 
country, is set forth in detain in HOME INSURERS SECRET TACTICS CHEAT FIRE 
VICTIMS (R., p. 241-249.) (Exhibit 9.) 
Suffice it to say there was a legally enforceable contract between appellant and respondent, 
which respondent State Farm failed to legally perform. In the interest of brevity, this discussion 
will not be stated again here. 
4. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
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In appellant's brief, this subject is discussed in detail on page 40 of the brief. It is important to 
emphasize that there was a legally enforceable contract between respondent, which respondent 
State Farm breached. 
In the interest of brevity, the full discussion set forth on page 40 of appellant's brief will not be 
repeated here. 
5. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Negligence Per Se 
Cause of Action 
Again, in the interest of brevity, the full discussion set forth on page 40- 41 of appellant's brief 
will not be repeated here. 
6. The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment on the Failure to Warn 
Cause of Action 
Once again, in the interest ofbrevity, the full discussion set forth on page 41-42 of appellant's 
brief will not be stated again. 
7. The District Court Improperly Denied the Motion to Amend the Complaint 
Appellant discussed this matter thoroughly in the appellant's brief on pages 42-46 of the brief. 
Moreover, appellant's past discussion in this reply brief establishes that there was a legally 
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enforceable contract between appellant and respondent, which respondent State Farm failed to 
legally perform. 
There is only one subject that it sensible to emphasize at this juncture. That is again the article by 
the national news agency, Bloomberg Markets Magazine. The article is entitled HOME 
INSURERS SECRET TACTICS CHEAT FIRE VICTIMS (R., p. 241-249.) It provides details of 
insurers misconduct, including State Farm's, all over the country. (R., P. 241-259.) 
In the interest of brevity though, the above topic which was discussed in detail in the appellant's 
brief and the reply brief will not be repeated here. 
8. The District Court Improperly Granted the Motion For Protective Order 
Finally, in the interest of brevity the full discussion set forth on pages 4 7-48 of appellant's brief 
will not be repeated here. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the above reasons, Plaintiff requests that this Court vacate the District Court's 
proceedings set forth above, remand the case for further proceedings, and provide the relief 
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requested from respondent State Farm Insurance Company, its counsel, and District Judge 
Timothy Hansen. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of July, 2012 
By, 
Roger Daniel Rizzo, In ProSe 
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EXHIBIT 
1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ROGER DANIEL RIZZO, 
Plaintiffs, Case No. CV-OC-1023300 
VS. ORDER 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter having come before the court for hearing on Plaintiffs 
Objection to the Clerk's Record on the 14th day of May, 2012, and good cause appearing 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiffs Objection to the Clerk's Record is DENIED; and 
2. Defendant's Request for Additional Records is GRANTED. 
~~ 
DATED this -day of May, 2012. 
ORDER- 1 
Honorable Timothy Hansen 
Ada County District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of May, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Roger Daniel Rizzo 
1583 North Sundown Way 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
ORDER-2 
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IN fHE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS'I:R.Lc:I:nk ~f"ft'rn'j1 VM1ER D. RICH, C erk 
THE STATE By KARl HOPP OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA oePVTY 
EVA MARIE RIZZO and ROGER 
DANIEL RIZZO. 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1023300 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND SUBSTITUTE ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
THE CLERK'S RECORD 
BACKGROUND 
This is an action ansing from a dispute regarding insurance coverage for damage to Plaintiff 
Roger Daniel Rizzo· s home. Pursuant to its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on January 
9. 2012, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiffs 
claims. A Judgment entered on February 15, 2012, dismissing Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. 
On January 27, 2012, prior to entry of the Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. On April 
12.2012, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Clerk's Record for the Idaho Supreme Court Appeal. as 
well as a Notice of Motion of Objection to the Clerk's Record for the Idaho Supreme Court Appeal. 
The Affidavit of Roger Daniel Rizzo was attached to Plaintiffs objection. On April 16, 2012. 
Defendant filed an Opposition to Objection to the Clerk's Record, along with Defendant-
Respondent's Request for Additional Record. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion to Object to the Clerk's Record was filed on April 19,2012. 
Heanng on these matters was held on May 14. 2012, at which time the Court ruled from the 
bench. On May 15. 2012. the Court entered an order concerning these matters. However. for the 
benefit of the record, the Court now feels it more appropriate to issue a written decision setting 
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fort!1 its reasoning with regard to those rulings. This written decision will serve as a substitute order 
for the one issued on May I 5, 2012. 
DISCUSSION 
Idaho Appellate Rule 28 sets forth the contents of a "standard record," and provides that the 
parties "are responsible for designating the documents which will comprise the clerk's record on 
appeal." l.A.R. 28(a). (b). In his Notice of Appeal, Plaintiff listed eight documents which he 
wished to be included in the clerk's record in addition to those documents already included 
pursuant to I.A.R. 28. At the May 14. 2012, heanng. Plamtiff mdicated that at some point he spoke 
to the appeals clerk of the District Court. who informed Plamtiff that a disc containing the entire 
court file in this matter had been sent to the Idaho Supreme Court. Shortly thereafter. Plaintiff filed 
his ohJeCtion to the clerk· s record. 
Settlement of the clerk's record in connection with an objection to such record by either 
party is a matter within the discretion of the district court. Lamar Corp. v. City ofT>vin Falls. 133 
Idaho 36, 40,981 P 2d 1146, 1150 (1999), citing Aker v. Aker, 52 Idaho 50, 56-57, 11 P 2d 372, 
375 (1932). As Defendant has noted, an objection to the clerk's record on the grounds of 
overinclusiveness would appear to be somewhat unusual. However, the Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed such an objection in Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls. In affirming the district court's 
denial of a party's request for deletion of certain documents from the clerk's record. the Idaho 
Supreme Court concurred with the following reasoning of the district court: 
[T]he Supreme Court has the determination as to what Information in the record it will 
consider as relevant. However. the Supreme Court cannot consider items outside of 
the record on appeal Because of this. judicial economy would dictate that it is 
better to include an item that the Supreme Court is free not to consider than to wrongly 
strike it and go through the additional process of augmentation. 
Lamar Corp .. 133 Idaho at 40. 981 P.2d at 1150. This reasoning is especially applicable in the case 
at bar. as Plaintiff, in filing his Notice of Appeal, did not specifically identify the issues 
encompassed by the appeal Considered as a whole, the Court in its discretion concludes that the 
clerk's record. which presently consists of the entire court file, is sufficient and appropriate. For 
purposes of judicial economy, the Court finds that the present record should continue, thereby 
avoiding the potential necessity for augmentation of the record at a later date pursuant to fAR 30 
Accordingly. Plaintiffs objection to the clerk's record is overruled 
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Plaintiff has mgued that Defendant's request for additional record is untimely pursuant to 
I.A.R. l9(c). which provides. in pertinent part: 
When the appellant has requested the standard transcript per l.A.R. 25 and the 
standard clerk's or agency's record per I.A.R. 28 and the respondent wants to include 
additional documents, the respondent must t!!e a request for this additional material 
\vithin 14 days of the filing of the notice of appeal or within 14 days of the amended 
notice of appeal that eliminated these additional documents. 
However. while I.A.R. 19(c) is applicable to the initial "designation of the record.'' Defendant's 
request was brought pursuant to l.A.R. 29(a). which deals with "settlement'' of the record. Idaho 
1 Appellate Rule 29(a) prov1des that after the clerk the distnct court serves the parties with the 
I transcript and record. the parties ··shall have 28 days from the date of service within which to 
file objections to the transcript or the record, including requests for corrections, additions or 
deletions." See ({/so ramar Corp.. 133 Idaho at 40, 981 P.2d at 1150. As noted above. Plaintiff's 
objection to the record was filed on April 12, 2012, shortly after he discovered that the clerk's 
record contained the entire court file, and Defendant's request for additional record was filed within 
a few days of Plaintiffs objection, on April 16, 2012. In any event, Defendant-Respondent's 
Request for Additional Record, which seeks the inclusion of the entire district court file, is 
unnecessary since the current clerk's record already includes the entire court file. For the reasons 
set lorth above. the clerk's record will remain unchanged. 
CONCLUSION 
Plamt1ffs Objection to the Clerk's Record for the Idaho Supreme Coun Appeal IS 
overruled. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this /8;K-day of May, 2012. 
' 
~--
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
l. Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority. do hereby certify that 1 have mailed. by 
United States MaiL on this 2day of May, 2012, one copy of the ORDER as notice pursuant to 
Rule 77(d) LC.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
ROGER DANIEL RIZZO 
!583 NORTH SL~DOWN WAY 
EAGLE. IDAHO 83616 
JEFFREY A. THOMSON 
ELAM & BURKE. P A 
251 EAST FRONT STREFT. SUITE 300 
P.O. BOX I 539 
BOIS DE. IDAHO 83 70 l 
CHRISTOPHER D. RlCH 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
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By JAMIE RANDALL ' 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
Roger Daniel Rizzo, 
Plaintiff 
Vs. 
State Farm Insurance Company, 
Defendant 
) CASE NO. ) cv oc 1023300 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) APPELLATE RULE 17 
) 
) 
) 
_________________________ ) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE FARM 
INSURANCE COMPANY, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- page 1 
1. The above named appellant, Roger Daniel Rizzo, appeals to the Idaho 
Supreme Court against the above named respondent, State Farm 
Insurance Company, from the JUDGMENT AND ORDERS listed 
below. 
The judge whom the motions at issue were brought before was District 
Court Judge Timothy Hansen. The Honorable Judge Hansen also 
presided over the motion hearings and entered the judgment and orders, 
which are now under appeal. 
2. The plaintiff has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment and orders described below are appealable pursuant to Rule 
ll(a)(l) and ll(a) (3) ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules (l.A.R.). 
3. The plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit, Roger Daniel Rizzo, is 
unemployable. Plaintiff was involved in a horrible motor vehicle 
accident over 16 years ago. During the accident, plaintiff suffered life 
threatening injuries to multiple parts of his body, including sustaining 
severe, traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff was hospitalized for over six 
months and almost all of the doctors who treated him told his family that 
he would die. 
Plaintiff has been certified by physicians as one-hundred percent 
disabled. His disability certification is permanent. He will remain one-
hundred percent disabled for the remainder of his life. (Documents 
confrrming this infirmity will be attached to plaintiff's appellant brief.) 
As a result of the acute injuries he sustained during his accident, plaintiff 
Roger Daniel Rizzo has not been employed for compensation by any 
employer since his horrible motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff also 
experiences seizures and has sleep apnea. Both of these additional 
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conditions also make him unemployable. (Documents confirming these 
infrrmities will be attached to plaintiff's appellant brief.) 
Plaintiff survives economically on disability proceeds and social security 
income. He could not afford to pay for Idaho counsel to represent him in 
this matter so he is representing himself in ProSe. 
After reviewing the Idaho District Court - For the District of Idaho Pro 
Se Handbook, plaintiff felt more comfortable about having to represent 
himself in this lawsuit. One of the paragraphs in Chapter 1 of the 
Handbook provides: 
"The mission of the United States District and Bankruptcy Courts for the 
District of Idaho is to provide an impartial and accessible forum for the 
just, timely, and economical resolution of legal proceedings within the 
jurisdiction of the courts, so as to preserve judicial independence, 
protect individual rights and liberties, and promote public trust and 
confidence." 
The defendant in this lawsuit, State Farm Insurance Company, is 
represented by James D. LaRue and Craig R. Yabui of the Elam and 
Burke, P.A. Law Firm. Defense counsel's address is 251 East Front 
Street, Suite 300 P.O. Box 1539 Boise, Idaho 83701. Defense counsel's 
telephone number is 343-5454. Defense counsel's fax number is 384-
5844. Neither of the attorneys representing State Farm Insurance 
Company lists their e-mail addresses on pleadings, discovery, or motions 
in the case. 
4. Plaintiff intends to assert the following issues on appeal regarding 
District Judge Timothy Hansen's judgment and orders in this litigation: 
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JUDGMENT AND ORDERS APPEALED 
A) District Judge Timothy Hansen's January 9, 2012 MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER granting defendant's MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Please refer to paragraph 5 in Pro Per 
Plaintiff's Affidavit.) 
B) District Judge Timothy Hansen's upcoming JUDGMENT WITH 
PREJUDICE dismissing Pro Per plaintiff Roger Daniel Rizzo's entire 
lawsuit. (Please refer to paragraphs 6 and 7 in Pro Per Plaintiff's 
Affidavit.) 
C) District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order 
denying Pro Per plaintiff's MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
TO ALLEGE A PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM. 
D) District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order 
denying Pro Per plaintiff's MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
TO ALLEGE A CLAIM FOR DIMUNITION IN VALUE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S HOME. 
E) District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order 
denying Pro Per plaintiff's MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
TO ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY. 
F) District Judge Timothy Hansen's March 15, 2011 interlocutory order 
granting defendant's MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
5. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
6. The ProSe appellant cannot afford and does not request a reporter's 
transcript. 
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7. The appellant requests that the following documents in the 
clerk's record be copied and sent to the Supreme court in addition to 
those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a. Pro Per plaintiff's Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment, 
including all attached affidavits and exhibits; 
b. District Judge Timothy Hansen's January 9, 2012 MEMORANDUM 
DECISION AND ORDER granting defendant's Motion for summary 
judgment; 
c. Pro Per plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, including attached 
affidavits and exhibits; 
d. Pro Per Plaintiff's Reply Brief on Motion to Amend Complaint, 
including attached affidavits and exhibits; 
e. Pro Per Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief on Motion to Amend 
Complaint, including attached affidavits and exhibits; 
f. District Judge Timothy Hansen's May 2, 2011 interlocutory order 
denying Pro Per plaintiff's Motion To Amend The Complaint; 
g. Pro Per plaintiff's Opposition To Motion For Protective Order, 
including attached affidavits and exhibits; 
h. District Judge Timothy Hansen's March 15, 2011 interlocutory order 
granting defendant's MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
8. I certify: 
a. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
b. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
c. That service has been made on the party required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. Defendant's counsel's address is: 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A, 
251 EAST FRONT STREET, SUITE 300 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-1539 
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Dated: This 26th day of January, 2012. 
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ATTORNEYS FEES 
On February 14, 2012, a hearing was held on the Motion Re The 
Proposed Judgment. The motion was brought because State Farm was 
seeking attorney's fees for prevailing on its Summary Judgment Motion. 
The motion was for the payment by plaintiff In ProSe of all attorney's 
fees incurred by State Farm to defend the entire lawsuit. In the 
courtroom, the judge granted the motion and ruled against plaintiff. 
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CHRISTOPHER D f~ICH. Cieri< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
EVA MARIE RIZZO and ROGER DANIEL 
RJZZO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV -OC-1 023300 
JUDGMENT 
The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on January 9, 2012, and the Court having previously entered its Order of 
Dismissal dismissing all claims that are or could have been stated by or on behalf of Eva Marie 
Rizzo in the Complaint filed on November 24, 20 l 0, and all claims that may be stated by or on 
her behalf in any amendment thereto, with prejudice, on March 15, 2011, therefore, entry of 
Judgment concerning all claims against Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
(erroneously sued as State Farm Insurance Company) is now proper. 
JUDGMENT- 1 
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56, DISMISSING Plaintiff Roger Daniel Rizzo's Amended Complaint against State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company, in its entirety, and WITH PREJUDICE. 
Attorney fees and costs of litigation respecting the claims asserted by Roger Daniel 
Rizzo, if any, will be assessed and ordered in a manner consistent with Rule 54 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
.f~"-jnrcv~ 
DATED this I cj-L~ day of .hmuary,'20 12. 
n+ 
Timothy Hansen 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r (L 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 day ofJatH:taFy 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Roger D. Rizzo 
1583 North Sundown Way 
Eagle, Idaho 83 616 
James D. LaRue 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
JUDGMENT- 2 
X 
'I 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission 
"- U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission 
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rN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I EVA MARJE RIZZO, 
Plaintiff, SUPREME COURT NO. }; O b / 1 
and 
ROGER DANIEL RJZZO, 
Plaintiff-Appe !!ant, 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
I 
vs. 
STATE F Afu\1 INSURfu~CE 
COMPANY. I . 
1 Defendant-Respondent 
Appeal from: Fourth Judicial Distnct, Ada County. 
Honorable Timothy Hansen, pres1ding. 
District Court case number: CV -OC-20 10-23300 
Appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order, filed January 9, 2012. 
Attorney for Appellant: Roger Daniel Rizzo, Appellant Pro Se 
Attorney for Respondent: J.affiea 0. LaR~:~e ~,\"·tJ·'~\...'-A, ;c.-\ I y \_ \_ 11 
Appealed by: Roger Daniel Rizzo · .; 
Appealed against: State Farm Insurance Co. 
Notice of Appeal filed: January 27, 20 J 2 
Amended Notice of Appeal filed: 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal filed: 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Respondent's Request for addit10nal clerks record filed· 
Respondent's Request for additional reporter's transcnpt filed: 
Name of Reporter: 
Was reporter's transcript requested') No 
' ' . 
,' ') :... .4 ........ . 
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Dated: January 30, 2cr¥2~ · )r: - J 
CHRJSTOPHER D. kiCJ\ '') ~. :10 / 
Clerk of the District ~lift '•.. ..• •• , -
1,. J ·~····· B~/fh '•, '} ,;,:ia(' 
Deputy Clertz 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
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JEFFREY A THOMSON 
251 East Front Str<:eL Suite 300 
i>ost Ortlce Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208 343-5454 
Fax 208 384-5844 
E-mail jat@elamburke.com 
Via Hand Delivery 
Honorable Timothy Hansen 
Ada County District Judge 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
May 15,2012 
RE: Roger Daniel Rizzo v. State Farm Insurance Company 
Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2010-23300 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39611 
E&B File No. 1-1274 
Dear Judge Hansen: 
ELAM & BURKE 
ATTORNEYS AT L;\W 
Enclosed please find the original and two copies of a proposed Order. I would ask that 
you please review the Order. If the Order meets with your approval, please sign the original and 
have your Clerk conform the copies to be returned to the parties in the enclosed envelopes. 
Thank you and please call should you have any questions or concerns. 
JAT/nlp 
Enclosures 
cc: Daniel Rizzo (w/encl.) 
Very truly yours, 
EXHI IT 
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"--, Home Insurers' Secret Tactics Cheat Fire 
Victims, Hike Profits 
By David Dietz and Darrell Preston -August 3, 2007 00:12 EDT 
Julie Twmell and neighbors stand near rebuilt homes 
Robert Hunter, a former Texas insurance commissioner 
hth..,. IIUN.IW hloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aiOpZROwhv... 2114/20 I 1 
Katherine Merritt, poses in Marietta, Georgia 
Amy Bach, executive director of United Policyholders 
Dr. Terry Bennett sits among his belongings 
Tim and Michele Ray in front of their tornado damaged ho 
Aug. 3 (Bloomberg) -- Julie Tunnell remembers standing in her debris-strewn driveway when the tall 
man in blue jeans approached. Her northern San Diego tudor-style home had been incinerated a week 
htto: / /www. bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=ai OpZROwhv. .. 2/14/20 1 1 
--o-------
earlier in the large~t wildfire. in California history. The blaze in October and November 2003 swept 
across an area 19 times the s1ze of Manhattan, destroying 2,232 homes and killing 15 people. 
Now came another blow. A representative of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. the 
largest home insurer in the U.S., came to the charred remnants of Tunnell's home to tell her,the 
company would pay just $220,000 of the estimated $306,000 cost of rebuilding the house. 
"It was devastating; I stood there and cried," says Tunnell, 42, who teaches accounting at San Diego 
City College. "I felt absolutely abandoned." 
Tunnell joined thousands of people in the U.S. who already knew a secret about the insurance 
industry: When there's a disaster, the companies homeowners count on to protect them from financial 
ruin routinely pay less than what policies promise. 
Insurers often pay 30-60 percent of the cost of rebuilding a damaged home -- even when carriers 
assure homeowners they're fully covered, thousands of complaints with state insurance departments 
and civil court cases show. 
Paying out less to victims of catastrophes has helped produce record profits. In the past 12 years, 
insurance company net income has soared-- even in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the worst natural 
disaster in U.S. history. 
Highest-Ever Profits 
Property-casualty insurers, which cover damage to homes and cars, reported their highest-ever profit 
of $73 billion last year, up 49 percent from $49 billion in 2005, according to Highline Data LLC, a 
Cambridge, Massachusetts-based firm that compiles insurance industry data. 
The 60 million U.S. homeowners who pay more than $50 billion a year in insurance premiums are 
often disappointed when they discover insurers won't pay the full cost of rebuilding their damaged or 
destroyed homes. 
Property insurers systematically deny and reduce their policyholders' claims, according to court 
records in California, Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, New Hampshire and Tennessee. 
The insurance companies routinely refuse to pay market prices for homes and replacement contents, 
they use computer programs to cut payouts, they change policy coverage with no clear explanation, 
they ignore or alter engineering reports, and they sometimes ask their adjusters to lie to customers, 
court records and interviews with former employees and state regulators show. 
'It's Despicable' 
As Mississippi Republicari U.S. Senator Trent Lott and thousarids of other homeowners have found, 
insurers make low offers -- or refuse to pay at all -- arid then dare people to fight back. 
"It's despicable not to make good-faith offers to everybody," says Robert Hunter, who was Texas 
insurance commissioner from 1993 to 1995 and is now insurance director at the Washington-based 
Consumer Federation of America. 
"Money managers have taken over this whole industry," Hunter says. "Their eyes are not on people 
who are hurt but on the bottom line for the next quarter." 
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T?e industry's drive for profit has overwhelmed its obligation to policyholders, says California 
L1eutenant Governor John Garamendi, a Democrat. As California's insurance commissioner from 
2002 to 2006, Garamendi imposed $18.4 million in fines against carriers for mistreating customers. 
"There's a fundamental economic conflict between the customer and the company," he says. "That is, 
the company doesn't want to pay. The first commandment of insurance is, 'Thou shalt pay as little and 
as late as possible."' 
Allstate Hires Consultant 
Although the tension between insurers and their customers has long existed, it was in the 1990s that 
the industry began systematically looking for ways to increase profits by streamlining claims 
handling. 
Hurricane Hugo was a major catalyst. The 1989 storm, which battered North and South Carolina, left 
the industry reeling from $4.2 billion in claims. 
In September 1992, Allstate Corp., the second-largest U.S. home insurer, sought advice on improved 
efficiency from McKinsey & Co., a New York-based consulting firm that has advised many ofthe 
world's biggest corporations, according to records in at least six civil court cases. 
State Farm, based in Bloomington, Illinois, and Los Angeles-based Farmers Group Inc., the third-
largest home insurer in the U.S., also hired McKinsey as a consultant, court records show. 
'Boxing Gloves' 
McKinsey produced about 13,000 pages of documents, including PowerPoint slides, in the 1990s, for 
Northbrook, Illinois-based Allstate. The consulting firm developed methods for the company to 
become more profitable by paying out less in claims, according to videotaped evidence presented in 
Fayette Circuit Court in Lexington, Kentucky, in a civil case involving a 1997 car accident. 
One slide McKinsey prepared for Allstate was entitled "Good Hands or Boxing Gloves," the tape of 
the Kentucky court hearing shows. For 57 years, Allstate has advertised its employees as the "Good 
Hands People," telling customers they will be well cared for in times of need. 
The McKinsey slides had a new twist on that slogan. 
When a policyholder files a claim, first make a low offer, McKinsey advised Allstate. If a client 
accepts the low amount, Allstate should treat the person with good hands, McKinsey said. If the 
customer protests or hires a lawyer, Allstate should fight back. 
"If you don't take the pittance they offer, they're going to put on the boxing gloves and they're going 
to batter injured victims," plaintiffs attorney J. Dale Golden told Judge Thomas Clark at the May 12, 
2005, hearing in which the lawyer introduced the McKinsey slides. 
The Alligator 
One McKinsey slide displayed at the Kentucky hearing featured an alligator with the caption ',Sit and 
~ Wait." The slide says Allstate can discourage claimants by delaying settlements and stalling court 
proceedings. 
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By postponing payments, insurance companies can hold money longer and make more on their 
investments-- and often wear down clients to the point of dropping a challenge. ·'An alligator sits and 
waits,1". GoJdenEtold the judge, as they looked at the slide describing a reptile. App 1cat10n rror 
McKinsey's advice helped spark a turnaround in Allstate's finances. The company's profit rose 140 
percent to $4.99 billion in 2006, up from $2.08 billion in 1996. Allstate lifted its income partly by 
paying less to its policyholders. 
'Stars in Alignment' 
Allstate spe~t 58 percent o~ its premium income in 2006 for claim payouts and the costs of the process 
compared With 79 percent m 1996, according to filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
The payout expense, called a loss ratio, changes each year based on events such as natural disasters; 
overall, it's been decreasing since Allstate hired McKinsey. 
Investors have noticed. Allstate's stock price jumped fourfold to $60.95 on July 11 from its closing 
price on June 3, 1993, the day of its initial public offering. During the same period, the Standard & 
Poor's 500 Index rose threefold. 
State Farm's profits have doubled since 1996 to $4.8 billion in 2006. Because State Farm is a mutual 
company, meaning it's owned by its policyholders, it doesn't have shares that trade publicly. 
''This is about as good a stretch as I've seen," says MichaRChren, who manages $1.5 billion at 
Allegiant Asset Management Co. in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, and has followed the property-
casualty industry for 20 years. 
The industry's performance during the past five years has been superb, even with payouts for Katrina, 
he says. "All the stars have been in alignment," he says. "There has been decent pricing of products 
and an extremely attractive and very low loss ratio." 
'More Audacious' 
Reducing payouts is just one way the industry has improved profits. 
Carriers have also raised premiums and withdrawn from storm-plagued areas such as the Gulf Coast 
of the U.S. and parts of Long Island, New York -- to lower costs and increase income, says Amy 
Bach, executive director of United Policyholders, a San Francisco-based group that advises 
consumers on insurance claims. 
''What this says is that the industry has been raking in spectacular profits while they're getting more 
and more audacious in their tactics," she says. 
Allstate spokesman Michael Siemienas says the company won't comment on what role McKinsey 
played in lowering the insurer's loss ratio and boosting its profits. Allstate did change the way it 
handles homeowners' insurance claims, he says. 
-----~- 'Absolutely Sound' 
''In the early 1990s, Allstate redesigned its claims practices to more efficiently and effectively handle 
claims and better serve our customers," he says. 
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"Allstate's goal remains the same: to investigate, evaluate and promptly resolve each claim based on 
its merits," Siemienas says. ··Allstate believes its claim processes support this goal and are absolutely 
sound." 
McKinsey doesn't discuss any of its work for clients, spokesman Mark Garrett says. 
Jerrv Choate, Allstate's chief executive officer from 1995 to 1998, said at a news conference in New 
York in 1997 that the company's new claims-handling process had reduced payments and increased 
profit, according to a report in a March 1997 edition ofNational Underwriter magazine. 
Insurers can't make significantly more money just from cutting sales costs, he told reporters. ·'The 
leverage is really on the claims side," Choate said. ··If you don't win there, I don't care what you do 
on the front end. You're not going to win." 
The more cash insurers can keep from premiums, the more they can invest. This pool of assets -- most 
of which the companies invest in government and corporate bonds -- is known as float. 
·Better Than Free' 
"Simply put, float is money we hold that is not ours but which we get to invest," billionaire Warren 
Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., wrote in his annual letter to shareholders this year. "When 
an insurer earns an underwriting profit, float is better than free," he wrote in 2006. 
Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire Hathaway generated 51 percent of its $11 billion profit in 2006 
from insurance. 
Claims payouts for the entire property-casualty industry have decreased in the past decade. In 2006, 
carriers paid out 55 percent of the $435.8 billion in premiums collected, according to the Insurance 
Information Institute, a trade group in New York. 
That compares with a 64 percent payout ratio on $267.6 billion in premium revenue in 1996. As 
companies pay less to policyholders, their investment gains are growing, according to the trade group 
and research firm A.M. Best Co. in Oldwick, New Jersey. 
·Purpose Evaporating' 
The industry has increased profits by an annual average of 46 percent since 1994, Institute data show. 
In 2006, carriers invested $1.2 trillion and recorded a net gain of $52.3 billion, up from $713.5 billion 
invested for a gain of $39.1 billion in 1994. 
Insurance companies are no longer following their mandate to take care of policyholders' money and 
then pay it out when needed, says Douglas Heller, executive director of the nonprofit Foundation for 
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights in Santa Monica, California. 
··The whole purpose of insurance is evaporating before our eyes as we continue to send checks to the 
companies," Heller says. "Insurers are looking to shed their purpose as a risk bearer and become 
financial institutions." 
~~ That kind of criticism is unwarranted, says Robert Hartwig, chief economist at the Insurance 
Information Institute. He says about 1 percent of policyholders contest what they're offered. 
·Justifiably Proud' 
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:'The insu:ance industry ~an be justifiably proud of its performance," Hartwig says. "It's in the 
msurance mdustry's best mterests to settle claims as fairly and as rapidly as possible." 
Companies have sharpened the use of technology in the past 20 years to help tighten claims payouts. 
Insurers following McKinsey's advice on claims processing have adopted computer programs with 
names such as Colossus and Xactimate. 
Colossus, made by El Segundo, California-based Computer Sciences Corp., calculates the cost of 
treating people injured in auto accidents, including the degree of pain and suffering thev'll endure and 
any permanent impairment they may have, according to Computer Sciences' Web site. · 
Xactimate, made by Xactware Solutions Inc. of Orem, Utah, is a program that estimates the cost of 
rebuilding a home. 
'Designed to Underpay' 
Insurers sometimes manipulate these programs to pay out as little as possible, lawsuits have asserted. 
"Programs like Colossus are designed to systematically underpay policyholders without adequately 
examining the validity of each individual claim," former Texas insurance commissioner Hunter told 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on April 11. 
He also criticized Xactimate. ''If you don't accept their offer, which is a low ball, you end up in 
court," Hunter said. "And that was the recommendation of McKinsey." 
Computer Sciences and Xactware declined to comment. 
Farmers Group, a subsidiary of Zurich Financial Services AG, agreed in 2005 to stop using Colossus 
to evaluate claims filed by policyholders who have accidents with uninsured or underinsured drivers. 
The move was part of a $40 million settlement in a class- action lawsuit in Pottawatomie County 
District Court in Oklahoma in which the plaintiffs claimed the company had repeatedly and wrongly 
failed to pay enough for crash injuries. 
'A Toothy Grin' 
An internal e-mail introduced in the Farmers lawsuit shows the company had pressured its adjusters, 
whom it calls claims representatives, or CRs, to pay out smaller amounts -- and rewarded them when 
they did. 
''As you know, we have been creeping up in settlements," David Harding, a Farmers claims manager, 
wrote in an e-mail to employees on Nov. 20,2001. "Our CRs must resist the temptation of paying 
more just to move this type file. Teach them to say, 'Sorry, no more,' with a toothy grin and mean it." 
Harding praised a worker for making low settlements. "It can be done as Darren consistently does," 
he wrote. "Ifhe keeps this up during 2002, we will pay him accordingly." 
Farmers said in court papers that it didn't seek to pay less than customers were due. "The e-mail 
/-, speaks for itself," Farmers wrote. "Plaintiffs characterization of it is denied." 
'More Efficient' 
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Edward Rust Jr., CEO of State Farm, testified in a 2006 civil case that his company revamped its 
claims handling through a project called ACE, or Advanced Claims Excellence. McKinsey suggested 
the use of ACE, according to evidence presented in the district court of Grady County, Oklahoma. 
"Technology has allowed us to really streamline our claim organization to be more efficient and 
responsive," Rust testified. He said the company wanted to cut expenses for claims. 
In the Oklahoma case, Bridget and Donald Watkins, whose Grady County house was destroyed 
during a tornado in 1999, accused State Farm of misrepresenting the damage from the storm and won 
a $12.9 million judgment in May 2006. Watkins and State Farm agreed to an undisclosed settlement 
after the judgment. 
Hunter, who also headed the federal flood insurance program under Presidents Gerald Ford and 
Jimmy Carter, told Congress that Allstate, with McKinsey's guidance, gave the name Claim Core 
Process Redesign to its strategy to change payout practices. 
As pervasive as computers have become in insurance, the key actor in settling claims is still the 
adjuster, the person who talks to policyholders and decides how much they should be paid. 
'Told To Lie' 
Allstate has asked adjusters to deceive customers, says JoAnn Katzman, who worked as a claims 
adjuster for Allstate in 2002 and 2003. She says managers regularly came to her office in Farmington 
Hills, Michigan, to give pep talks on keeping claim payments down. 
They awarded prizes such as portable refrigerators to adjusters who tried to deny claims by blaming 
fires on arson without justification, she says. "We were told to lie by our supervisors," says Katzman, 
49, who quit by taking a company buyout in 2003. "It's tough to look at people and know you're 
lying." 
Katzman says an adjuster at Allstate, on orders from a supervisor, told an 89-year-old Detroit fire 
victim that Allstate wouldn't replace cabinets in her home even though the insurance policy said they 
were covered. 
In another case, Katzman says Allstate wouldn't replace a fire-damaged refrigerator -- an appliance 
she says was covered. Katzman now runs Accurate Estimating Services, an independent adjusting 
company in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. 
Allstate's Siemienas declined to comment on Katzman's statements. 
Punitive Damages 
Insurers sometimes order employees to offer replacement cost settlements that have no connection to 
actual prices of home contents, according to testimony in a civil trial. 
A jury in November 2005 awarded Larry Stone and Linda Della Pelle $5.2 million in punitive 
damages and $616,000 to construct a new house after finding that Fidelity National Insurance Co. of 
Jacksonville, Florida, had underpaid the couple by $183,000 when it offered them $433,000 to rebuild 
their two-story Claremont, California, residence. 
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During the trial in L~s Angeles Superior Court, Ricardo Echeverria, the couple's attorney, questioned 
~enneth ~rak~, president of Canyon Country, California-based RJG Construction Inc., who had been 
h1red by F1dellty s lawyers to evaluate damage estimates. 
'Do You Think That's Fair?' 
'' ~~e you telling us th~t sometimes, because the insurance carriers dictate what amounts they are 
w11lmg to allow for urnt costs, estimators then have to comply with that?" asked Echeverria, according 
to the court transcript. 
··That's absolutely true," Drake said. 
'·Do you think that's fair?" Echeverria asked. 
"Fair or not, it's the name of our business," Drake said. 
Drake declined to comment on his testimony. Fidelity is appealing the award. 
A New Hampshire case involving a home destroyed in a fire exposed another insurance company 
tactic: changing a policy retroactively. 
In April2003, the Rockingham county attorney in Kingston, New Hampshire, found that a unit of 
Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. had deleted the replacement cost portion of the homeowner's 
policy of Terry Bennett after his five-bedroom house burned to the ground in 1993. 
'Wrong End' 
Bennett, a physician, sued Twin City Fire Insurance Co., claiming his home and its contents --
including antiques and fine art -- were worth $20 million, not the $1.7 million the insurer paid him. 
After an 11-year battle, he settled with Hartford in 2004 for an undisclosed amount. 
"Fighting an insurance company is like staring down the wrong end of a cannon," Bennett says. 
An unprecedented number of people stared down that cannon after Hurricane Katrina. The August 
2005 storm killed more than 1,600 people in Louisiana and Mississippi, left 500,000 people homeless 
and cost insurers $41.1 billion. 
More than 1,000 homeowr1ers sued their insurers in the wake of the storm -- the largest-ever number 
of insurance lawsuits stemmirlg from a U.S. natural disaster. 
For insurers, the multibillion-dollar question regarding Katrirla was how much of the destruction was 
caused by wind and how much by water. Property insurance policies don't cover damage caused by 
flooding; homeowners have to purchase separate insurance administered by the U.S. government. 
Altering Reports 
The wind/water issue has spurred allegations that insurers manipulated the findings of adjusters and 
engmeers. 
Ken Overstreet, an engineer based in Diamondhead, Mississippi, who examined destroyed Gulf Coast 
residences, says someone altered his findirlgs on the cause of the damage to at least four homes. 
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"We were working for insurance companies, and they wanted certain results," says Overstreet who 
has been a licensed civil engineer since 1981. ''They wanted to get a desired outcome and tha~'s what 
they did." ' 
Overstreet, who. w~ :vo:king for Houston-based Rimkus Consulting Group Inc., prepared a report on 
the Gulfport, MISSISSippi, home of Hubert and Joyce Smith for Meritplan Insurance Co. The engineer 
found that both wind and water had damaged the house. 
"The winds out of the east would have racked the entire structure to the west and simply lifted the 
footings up," he wrote. 
Rejected 
Meritplan declined to pay anything to the Smiths, telling them that all of the damage was caused by 
water. The company sent the Smiths what it said was Overstreet's engineering report. 
"Due to the extent of the structural damage to the residence, the storm surge accounted for the 
damage," the report they got said. 
The Smiths called Overstreet and asked him to look at what Meritplan had sent them. Overstreet savs 
he looked at both reports side by side and then told the couple that someone had changed his • 
conclusion after his inspection. 
"If they defrauded me, how many more did they defraud?" asks Hubert Smith, 88, a retired 
chiropractor. "There's a lot of crap going on." 
Six lawsuits against Rimkus allege the company altered engineering reports. ··Those allegations are 
absolutely false," says Arch Currid, a Rimkus spokesman. ''There's no fact to those claims. We're 
going to vigorously defend ourselves in court, and we're confident we will prevail." 
Lawsuit Settled 
Ed Essa, a spokesman for Calabasas, California-based Countrywide Financial Corp., the parent of 
Meritplan, says the company confidentially settled a lawsuit with the Smiths in March. 
Another engineer involved in Katrina, Bob Kochan, CEO of Forensic Analysis & Engineering Corp., 
says State Farm asked him to redo his reports because the insurer disagreed with the engineers' 
conclusions. Kochan sent an Oct. 17, 2005, e-mail to his staff saying State Farm executive Alexis 
·' Lecky" King asked for the changes. 
· 'Lecky told me that she is experiencing this same concern with other engineering companies," 
Kochan wrote. "In her words, 'They are all too emotionally involved and working too hard to find 
justifications to call it wind damage."' 
Kochan says he complied so State Farm didn't cut its contract with his company. ·'They didn't like 
our conclusions," he says. ''We agreed to re-evaluate each of our assignments." 
'Serious Concern' 
Randy Dowr1, an engineer at Raleigh, North Carolina-based Forensic, wrote this Oct. 18, 2005, e-mail 
response to Kochan: "I have a serious concern about the ethics of this whole matter. I really question 
the ethics of someone who wants to fire us simply because our conclusions don't match theirs." 
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Thee-mails were made public in a civil case against State Farm in Jackson, Mississippi. 
State ~arm ~pokesm_an ~hil S~pple_says Kochan's e-mail comments are out of context. He says 
somet1mes mformat10n m engmeenng reports doesn't support the conclusions. 
One State Farm policyholder in Mississippi was Senator Lott, who lost his home in Katrina. He sued 
State Farm for fraud in U.S. District Court in Jackson, after the insurer ruled that his home had been 
damaged by water and refused to pay him anything. 
"It's long ove~due for this industry to be held accountable" Lott, 65, says. Lott and State Farm agreed 
to a confidential settlement in April. 
Trent Lott's Bill 
Lott has introduced legislation to have insurers regulated by the federal government. That would 
supplant a patchwork system of regulation by states. Insurance has no body analogous to the SEC, 
which can refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. 
That doesn't happen with insurers. The most that state insurance departments typically do is impose 
civil fines when companies mistreat customers. Such sanctions are weak and infrequent, says Hunter, 
the former Texas insurance commissioner. 
Before Katrina, no state or federal prosecutor had ever investigated a nationally known property-
casualty company for criminal mistreatment of policyholders. Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood 
says a federal grand jury is probing insurance company claims handling after the hurricane. 
There was no criminal investigation after State Farm offered just 15 percent of replacement costs to 
Michele and Tim Ray, whose house was wrecked by a tornado in April 2006. A contractor estimated 
the cost to rebuild the Hendersonville, Tennessee, home at $254,000. 
Living Amid Ruins 
State Farm made three inspections of the property, Ray says, and sent the Rays a check for $36,000, 
which the couple returned. A year after the twister, the couple remained in the damaged home, with 
their tattered roof covered by tarpaulins. 
In April, after Bloomberg News submitted questions to State Farm about the Ray case, the company 
inspected the house again. This time, it gave the Rays $302,000. 
"We decided to call it a total loss and agreed to pay the policy limits after deciding the damage was 
caused by the storm," State Farm spokesman Shawn Johnson says. 
State Farm won't discuss what role McKinsey played in helping the insurer shape its approach toward 
customers. Similarly, no official at any insurer that hired McKinsey is willing to talk about the 
consulting firm. 
·Doing What is Right' 
Privately held McKinsey, which has 14,000 employees in 40 countries, has worked for many of the 
largest companies in the world, according to its Web site. "We take pride in doing what is right rather 
than what is right for the profitability of our firm," Managing Director Ian Davis says in a quote 
posted on the site. 
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McK~nsey pioneered the ov~rhaul of the property-casualty industry at Allstate. The company hired 
McKmsey .m ~ 992 after t~e msurer was spun off from what's now Sears Holdings Corp. of Hoffman 
Estates, I.llmois, says David Berardinelli, a Santa Fe, New Mexico, lawyer who won access to view 
the McKmsey documents for a limited time during a lawsuit involving an auto accident. 
McKinsey a?vised the insurer to pay claims quickly at low amounts while delaying payments for as 
long as possible for those who wanted large settlements, Berardinelli says. ··They're capitalizing on 
the vulnerability of people" he says. 
Berardinelli says McKinsey suggested that Allstate hold so- called town hall meetings with claims 
adjusters to urge them to pay less to customers. 
Shannon Kmatz, a former Allstate claims adjuster, says she attended some of those sessions. She says 
managers told employees to keep claim payouts as low as possible. 
Looking at Stock Price 
''The leaders of those town hall meetings were always concerned that we were doing our part to help 
the stock price by keeping claims down," says Kmatz, 34, who worked for Allstate for three years in 
New Mexico in the late 1990s and is now a police officer. ''It was obvious from the get-go that all 
they were concerned about was the bottom line." 
Just once, at the May 2005 hearing in Lexington, Kentucky, the PowerPoint slides McKinsey 
prepared for Allstate were made public. William Hager and his wife, Geneva, who suffered neck and 
~.. back injuries after the family's car was rear-ended in a 1997 accident in Lexington, sued the insurer, 
claiming the company failed to cover her medical expenses. 
The case is scheduled to go to trial in October. 
One McKinsey slide prepared for Allstate was called "Zero- Sum Economic Game," a videotape of 
the court hearing shows. The slide explains that there are winners and losers, and the insurance 
company can win by paying out small amounts. 
·Finite Pool of Money' 
"There is a finite pool of money," Golden, the plaintiffs attorney, told the judge at the hearing. 
"Either it goes to the injured victim or it goes to Allstate's pocket as surplus." 
Allstate's attorney at the hearing, Mindy Barfield of Lexington, didn't say anything about the 
McKinsey slides. She didn't return phone calls seeking her comments. 
Former federal flood insurance commissioner Hunter says the McKinsey approach exploits 
policyholders. 
··McKinsey presented it as a zero-sum game in which the winners would be Allstate and the losers 
would be the claimants," Hunter says. ·'I don't think a claims system should be viewed in that light. 
It's against any principles on how you should settle insurance claims. They should be settled on their 
merits." 
Allstate convinced the judge to seal the McKinsey slides before and after the Lexington hearing. The 
insurer has resisted attempts to make the consulting firm's work public in courts across the U.S., 
arguing it contains trade secrets. 
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In 2004, the company was sanctioned by the Bartholomew Circuit Court in Indiana and fined $10 000 
for refusing to turn over the records to attorney Richard Enyon, representing an auto accident victim. 
Allstate held on to the documents and appealed the punishment. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the sanction. 
'Go To Court' 
Allstate then appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, which hasn't yet made a decision. 
~awsuits in Cali~omia, Florida and Texas have asserted that McKinsey's work for Allstate helped the 
msurer cheat clmmants. Records show that through the company's Claim Core Process Redesign 
project, Allstate encouraged policyholders to accept small settlements on the spot. 
The redesig~ also became a blueprint for fighting more claims in court as Allstate increased its legal 
staff, accordmg to a 1997 company newsletter obtained by David Poore, a Petaluma, California, 
attorney who has represented homeowners in lawsuits against carriers. 
"The bottom line is that Allstate is trying more cases than ever before," the newsletter said. "If the 
offer is not accepted, Allstate will go to court, if necessary, to prove the evaluation process is sound." 
San Diego Fire 
McKinsey-style tactics have spread to insurers large and small, as homeowners discovered after three 
wildfires ravaged Southern California in 2003, including the one that hit northern San Diego. 
While Katrina struck thousands of low-income families in New Orleans, the San Diego fire affected 
mostly affluent homeowners, who fared no better with their insurance companies. 
The fire obliterated large sections of Scripps Ranch, a community of 30,000 that sits atop a sagebrush 
and eucalyptus mesa, where homes can cost more than $1 million. 
After flames swept through the area on winds of up to 50 miles per hour, residents say they expected 
their insurance companies to live up to coverage promises and pay the full cost to rebuild. 
The Southern California fires led to 676 formal complaints to the state saying insurers offered payouts 
that fell far short of actual costs and delayed on paying claims. 
No Inkling 
One of the Scripps Ranch houses that went up in flames, a four-bedroom, gray-stucco home on a 
sloping cul-de-sac, belonged to J.P. Lapeyre, a division director at JDS Uniphase Corp., a Milpitas, 
California, maker of telecommunications equipment. 
Lapeyre, 41, who is married and has two children, says he had no inkling as he viewed the remains of 
his house that his insurance would leave him $280,000 short of what he would need to rebuild. 
Representatives of Pacific Specialty Insurance Co. of Menlo Park, California, told him the most the 
firm would pay out was $168,075, not even half of the estimated reconstruction cost of $448,000. 
The Pacific Specialty representative told Lapeyre in November 2003 that the insurer would pay $75 a 
square foot (0.09 square meter) to rebuild his 2,241-square-foot house. "What frustration," Lapeyre 
says. "I had to try to prove to them that it would cost $200 a square foot." 
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That figure came separately from two builders, Norton Construction and TLC Contractors, both of 
San Diego. 
Lapeyre's Suit 
In February 2005, Lapeyre filed suit in San Diego County Superior Court against his insurer and the 
independent broker who sold him the policy, alleging negligence, breach of contract and fraud for 
leading him to believe that he was properly covered. 
After a fight of 19 months, Lapeyre dropped the suit when Pacific Specialty told a mediator assigned 
to the case it wouldn't raise its offer, he says. "We decided it was time to get on with our lives and 
move forward," says Lapeyre, who borrowed money to build a new house. 
Karen and Bill Reimus, both lawyers, fought their carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., when it told 
them it wouldn't pay the couple enough to rebuild their burned Scripps Ranch house. 
Karen, 40, says an agent for Boston-based Liberty Mutual assured her and her husband when they 
bought their house four months before the 2003 fire that their insurance would replace the home if it 
were destroyed. 
'A Low Ball' 
In a December 2003 letter, two months after the fire, Liberty Mutual offered to pay $40,000 less than 
the limit of the couple's policy, Karen says. In early 2004, San Diego-based Gafcon Construction 
.~ Consultants determined the cost to rebuild was well above the limits of the couple's policy. 
The Reimuses began a phone and letter campaign to convince the company its offer was too low, 
Karen says. "It has now been almost seven months since the loss and we are still not agreed as to the 
numbers," Karen wrote in a May 13, 2004, letter to Liberty Mutual. 
Two weeks later, Liberty Mutual agreed to raise the couple's limits by $100,000, Karen says. ·'This is 
clear evidence that the original estimate was a low ball," she says. 
Liberty Mutual spokesman Glenn Greenbenz says the company won't discuss the case because its 
dealings with policyholders are private. 
"The system is set up to take advantage of people when they're at their weakest," Karen says. "We 
went to one of the most-expensive companies in the country because we wanted to be ready for a 
rainy day. We asked for coverage that would replace the house. We thought replacement meant 
replacement." 
Allstate Suit 
Scripps Ranch couple Leslie Mukau and Robin Seaberg sued Allstate for alleged fraud and negligence 
for failing to pay the $900,000 that contractors estimate it would cost to replace their two-story home. 
Allstate offered the Seabergs $311,000, according to the 2004 San Diego County Superior Court suit. 
Allstate says in court papers the couple hasn't shown the company was negligent and asked for 
.~- ·· dismissal of the suit, which is pending. 
The California Department of Insurance examined the practices of Allied Property & Casualty 
Insurance Co., AMCO Insurance Co. and Allstate in connection with the California fires. 
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It fi.ned Allied.and A~C?, both based in Des Moines, Iowa, a total of $20,000 for misleading nine 
policyholders mto behevmg they were insured for full value. The regulators cited Allstate for six rule 
violations, including that it ignored complaints that it underinsured homeowners. 
Fines 'Too Small' 
The state didn't fine Allstate, which told the department it had done nothing wrong. 
"Fines by state regulatory agencies have been far too small and infrequent to deter unfair business 
pra~tices," United Policyholders' Bach says. "It's clear that cheating by insurers is a big, profitable 
busmess and regulators can't muster the will or political strength to stop them." 
Most homeowners take what insurers offer because they don't realize they're being deceived or 
conclude that fighting is too costly and difficult, Bach says. 
"Virtually everyone who settles for what the insurer offers is taking less than they're owed," she says. 
Homeowners across the U.S. have found themselves in the same situation. Kevin Hazlett, a lawyer, 
sued Farmers Group after an April 2006 tornado struck his home in O'Fallon, Illinois. 
'Thin Air' 
Farmers had offered to pay him $470,000 to rebuild the house. Royal Construction Inc., based in 
Collinsville, Illinois, estimated the cost at $1.1 million. Hazlett, 52, accepted a settlement for an 
undisclosed amount. 
Hazlett says Illinois Farmers, a subsidiary of Farmers, used the Xactimate software program to first 
determine what it would pay out. "They're just pulling numbers out of thin air," he says. "There's no 
rhyme or reason." Farmers spokesman Jerry Davies didn't respond to requests for an interview. 
Bo Chessor, owner of Royal Construction, says he sees insurers refusing to pay coverage limits all the 
time. "Most people just roll over and take it because they don't have the money to fight it," Chessor 
says. "What the insurance companies are doing is purely robbery." 
It may be robbery, but it's rarely a crime. State insurance departments don't prosecute insurance 
companies, and the federal government has no oversight. The insurance industry wants to keep it that 
way. 
Insurance Lobbying 
To make their voice heard on federal regulation and other government decisions, insurers spent $98 
million on lobbying in Washington in 2006, according to PoliticalMonevLine, a unit of Congressional 
Quarterly. That's the second-largest amount spent on lobbying by any group, behind $114.4 million 
by pharmaceutical companies. 
Property-casualty companies do want something from the government: bailouts. Insurers beseech 
states and the federal government to foot more of the bill for rebuilding private homes after natural 
disasters. 
Florida has a catastrophe fund that insures some homes to reduce payouts by carriers. The fund paid 
out about $8.45 billion for storm damage in 2004 and 2005, according to its annual report. The federal 
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flood insurance program covers $800 billion of property nationally, which helped the industry 
increase profits by 25 percent in 2005, the year of Katrina. 
Disaster Just the Beginning 
Hom~owners whose properties have been destroyed by catastrophes contend with low payouts, higher 
premmms, software programs that underestimate rebuilding costs and sudden changes in policy 
values •• all of which have been calculated methods for insurers to increase profits. 
Tunnell, the San Diego accounting teacher whose home burned to the ground, says she thought State 
Farm had adequately insured her family when they bought their three-bedroom house in 1992. She 
says the policy, destroyed in the fire, provided for "full replacement coverage." 
It guaranteed to rebuild the house, no matter the cost, she says. The company offered to pay $220,000 
--which was $86,000 less than a $306,000 figure her family got from State Farm's own estimator, 
Hers urn Construction Inc. of San Diego, for rebuilding the 1, 700-square-foot house. 
State Farm spokesman Supple says the company sent letters in 1997 to the Tunnells and other 
policyholders saying that it would no longer offer full replacement coverage. ''Policyholders, by 
regulatory order, were sent prominent notices of the coverage change at that time," he says. 
'This is Unthinkable' 
Tunnell says she doesn't recall being notified. She says her family debated hiring a lawyer and suing, 
and eventually decided the battle would be too stressful. The Tunnells took the $220,000 and 
borrowed money to build a new house. 
"Why is this happening to people over and over again?" Tunnell asks. "State Farm keeps 
underinsuring people, and they get away with it. This is unthinkable." 
As long as insurers make the rules and control the game, Tunnell and homeowners across the U.S. 
won't know whether their homes are fully insured, no matter what their policies say. 
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